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POWs and Politics - Part 2
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This propaganda was also used against American soldiers in Vietnam. An interrogation report of an Enemy Proselytizing cadre stated "Photographs of peace movements had been sent to COSVN by the peace organizations in the US and these were used in the leaflets (NFI) and sometimes produced by the Source himself."60 The collection of personnel effects of American soldiers was necessary for use in this propaganda campaign. One captured document "informs addresses that Anti-Vietnam war movement was spreading in the United States, and there exists a requirement to furnish this movement with personnel belongings of US servicemen. When above mentioned items are captured, they should be transferred to the Hai Hung Province Current Affairs Committee for report and transfer to higher headquarters by Hai Hung Military Proselytizing section."61 Other documents state that "In the event corpses of US KIA are recovered from a battleground, they should be secretly buried after removing all personnel effects. Their graves should be marked for future recognition."62 Another captured document issued in 1970 by the Standing Committee of the southern arm of the Politburo called for all units to continue efforts aimed at capturing American personnel effects. They were instructed to hide the bodies of Americans killed-in-action (KIA), and to collect all personal documents for forwarding to Hanoi.63 Such documents were needed in order to develop propaganda broadcasts oriented toward POW/MIA family members in the United States. One such broadcast came in November 1967 when Hanoi announced the death of USMC Lance Corporal James O. Pyle. Actually Pyle was alive and well, but his field pack with letters containing the address of his parents in America was captured by PAVN forces during an attack. Thus Pyle's personal documents, which were lost in the area of Danang, found their way to Hanoi for propaganda purposes.64 In Laos, the PAVN-advised Lao Binh van efforts were similar to those conducted by the communists in South Vietnam. Since approximately 85 per cent of the MIA cases in Laos involving U.S. personnel have incident locations in areas that were under the wartime control of Vietnamese forces, many POW/MIA analysts believe that the Vietnamese could also rapidly solve many of the Lao cases. This is not to say that the Lao themselves do not possess records pertaining to American POWs. An example of Lao record-keeping is shown by the acquisition of a document pertaining to Cpt. Walter H. Moon from Rudy, Arkansas. This document was obtained from refugee sources in Thailand, and was titled "Biography of a Prisoner." It was obtained from a collection of similar documents from the Lao Military High Command Headquarters in Vientiane during the early 1980's. Although Cpt. Moon was executed while being held prisoner in a fixed camp, his remains have not been returned. Lao Military Security personnel observed in the same office where the document was obtained have been identified as having been involved with U.S. POWs during the war, and having participated in meetings with U.S. officials and MIA family members arriving in Laos to discuss the POW/MIA issue. Moreover, recent SIGINT information indicates that in June 1977 the Lao moved to secretly recover the remains of the Americans killed at Site 85.65 Additionally, a CIA cable indicates that the most senior levels of the Lao government maintained a "central and highly classified record of American pilots captured by Lao and Vietnamese forces during the war in Laos."66 Later DIA cables cited a source that said the Vietnamese removed those records because of Lao looting of crash sites.67 In southern Laos along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, captured Americans were moved to the nearest PAVN military station (Binh Tram) and transferred to the control of Logistics Group (Doan) 559. A CIA report describes the organization of this important group: "In support of increasing requirements for PAVN involvement in Laos, the Lao Dong Party established in 1959 a central control authority over all PAVN activities in Laos. Designated after the date of its establishment, Group (Doan)/Office 959 was under dual command of the Central Committee's Central Western Affairs Department (Ban Cong Tac Mien Tay Trung Uong) Military Staff and the Ministry of National Defense. Until 1968, Office 959 was responsible for control of all PAVN units in Laos. In 1968, control over PAVN combat units and advisory personnel to the LPLA was reorganized. Office 959 relinquished its control over PAVN units in the north to the PAVN Northwest Military Region, and its control over PAVN units in central and south Laos to PAVN Military Region 4 group 68, which later became known as Group/Division 968. Office 959 and its subordinate advisory groups became solely responsible for advisory assistance to the LPLA, although it continued to coordinate its activities with the PAVN Northwest Region and with PAVN military Region Group 68. This organizational system for PAVN operations in Laos remained intact through at least 1975."68 Several North Vietnamese advisory units were deployed by Vietnam to Laos during the war. At differing times, PAVN advisory groups operating in Laos included Groups 6, 95, 100, 363, and 763. The Lao High Command Political Staff's Military Security Section (Suan Sua Ka Suc)(i.e., Binh van element) had approximately 200 personnel engaged in recruitment and penetration operations against enemy forces. Coordination for inter-party liaison between Vietnam and Laos was the responsibility of International Liaison Group 101. That the Vietnamese were closely involved with U.S. POWs in Laos during the war is borne out by the fact that they have now repatriated the remains of at least three Americans lost in Laos, including two from deep inside Lao territory. Moreover, personal effects of some Americans lost in Laos have been "discovered" in the Archives of the Central Military Museum in Hanoi. Office 22, Group 875, Military Justice Department One of the most important post-war reports on Hanoi's policies has been that of an individual known as "The Mortician." An ethnic Chinese, he left Vietnam in 1979 as part of the purge of Vietnamese with Chinese heritage. His duties included the recovery of both French and American remains, and their subsequent storage and warehousing in Hanoi. He worked for an organization known as Office 22, Group 875, of the Military Justice Department of the PAVN High Command. Vietnam was embarrassed by reports of "warehousing and storage" provided by "The Mortician," who testified before a concerned U.S. Congress. The Mortician described in great detail a plan for exploiting the issue of U.S. remains initiated by the VCP in 1963. According to the mortician, sometime during 1969, he was transferred from his normal duties involving the processing and storage of French remains to work with the remains of Americans. He said that as of 1964, the remains of U.S. servicemen were already being preserved and stored in Hanoi. When he testified before Congress, the Mortician at first estimated he had personally prepared some 452 remains of Americans. He later revised his estimate to indicate that he had personally prepared some "290 sets" of remains, and he had observed approximately 400 "boxes" said to contain U.S. remains in a Hanoi warehouse. The Mortician was administered a polygraph examination with no deception indicated. The Government of Vietnam denounced the testimony of the mortician as being a fabrication. The denial continued until 1991 when visiting delegations to Hanoi were told that "we did at one time warehouse remains but now we have returned them and we don't do this anymore." After Pentagon analysts announced their opinion that the Mortician was judged to be a reliable Source, apparently Hanoi strategists accepted the fact that his testimony was unshakable. Although at that point Vietnam had unilaterally returned over 400 remains, thus approximating the total number of "boxes" observed by the Mortician, only about 69% of the remains returned and identified as Americans bore scientific evidence of processing and storage. Further reinforcing the belief that Hanoi was only partially cooperating, another Source, who was a defector during the war arrested shortly after the collapse of the Republic of Vietnam Government, related his detailed account of having observed some 600 U.S. remains in Bat Bat Prison west of Hanoi. This Source described shelves containing U.S. remains packaged in clear plastic bags, along with several "flight suits" of U.S. pilots stored in the same building. Forensic scientists of the Central Identification Laboratory-Hawaii (CILHI) later detected pieces of plastic similar to that described by this Source adhered to several remains repatriated unilaterally by Vietnam. During a visit to the Bat Bat Prison of the PAVN Military Police and Criminal Investigation Department in 1992, one of the authors was able to confirm that the handwritten sketch provided by the Source of this report matched, almost identically, the actual configuration of the prison. However, the actual storage building mentioned by the Source had been completely cleaned and renovated with no visible signs of human remains. The defecting Mortician also related another intriguing story concerning the presence of three Americans remaining in Vietnam as late as 1979. According to the Mortician, these three men elected to remain in Vietnam to assist the PAVN. The Mortician recalled having seen the three Caucasians at the facility of Office 22, Group 875 where records on U.S. casualties were maintained. During a subsequent meeting with Mr. Robert Garwood, the mortician identified him as being one of the three individuals he observed. The Mortician heard that the other two men were also Americans who were living outside Hanoi. Some government analysts have expressed the opinion that the two unidentified men are, or were, Russian or other Eastern bloc country technicians. However, if the Vietnamese are truly being "absolutely superb" in their level of cooperation, surely they could have at least notified U.S. officials concerning the identities of these two men and should have been willing to arrange an interview by U.S. investigators. The officer in charge of Group 875 was interviewed in April 1993. This organization was responsible for the burial, preservation, and repatriation of the remains of 23 Americans who died in the prison system. PAVN Colonel Doan Hanh related that while the Enemy Proselytizing Department had no responsibility for recovering American remains, he was sure they were aware of Office 22's activities. Furthermore, "the Central Office of the Communist Party directed the efforts to recover U.S. remains."69 The role of Group 875 remains somewhat of a mystery. The authors believe that Group 875 served as a Task Force designed to link the various ministries involved in the overall POW/MIA issue. This Task Force provided the administrative and logistical support required to recover American remains in Hanoi and the surrounding areas. Most likely this was done in anticipation of U.S. demands during the final stages of the Paris Peace Talks. MPS documents turned over in 1995 indicate that MPS officials queried Public Security cadre in various provinces regarding the location and number of American remains in their provinces. Another document described the relationship between the Military Justice Department (MJD, now reorganized in the General Political Directorate as the "Military Police and Criminal Investigation Department") and the MPS. "Between 1964 and March 1973, the MJD worked jointly with the Ministry of Public Security (now known as the Ministry of Interior) in guarding U.S. prisoners of war (POW's) in the northern SRV. During this period, the MJD was tasked with providing physical protection for U.S. POW detention facilities, such as the Son Tay facility. It had no jurisdiction over the central Hoa Lo Prison in Hanoi, which was guarded by, and under the administration of, the Ministry of Public Security. Although the MJD provided external guard forces for other U.S. POW detention facilities, the internal administration of these facilities was under the Ministry of Public Security, which maintained U.S. POW records and directed the interrogation of U.S. POW's."70 Office KG-5 of the MPS also performed forensic science duties in the processing of the remains of Americans who died in captivity. KG-5 personnel were included in Vietnamese delegations that visited the JCRC and the CILHI in Hawaii. KG-5 personnel normally examined U.S. remains at the Forensics Laboratory located in the Da Phuc area northwest of Hanoi, or the Criminal Science Institute located at 66A Yet Kieu Street in Hanoi. To accommodate the processing of remains of Americans who died in the south, KG-5 established an additional section in Office "B" of the MPS located in southern Vietnam designated KG-5B. In processing skeletal remains for repatriation to the United States, Office KG-5 coordinated with hospitals like Military Hospital 108 (Quan y Vien 108) in Hanoi. The bodies of the 23 American POWs who died in captivity in North Vietnam were taken to Hospital 108, prior to being repatriated to the U.S. Detailed "death certificates" describing the causes of death of each man who died in captivity were prepared by Military Hospital 108, and these documents accompanied the repatriated remains of the 23 men. According to the CILHI, the combined efforts of the MPS and MND resulted in a very efficient system for recovering and storing U.S. remains and personal effects. A 1991 memo of the laboratory indicated "CILHI had prepared a bar chart displaying the number of identified remains received during official repatriations from the SRV since March 1973, with contrasting bars showing the number of remains exhibiting some evidence of storage. The chart and supporting statistics were as of 31 January 1991. The total number of identified remains was 260; the total number showing evidence of storage was 158."71 This study proved, beyond a shadow of doubt, that Hanoi continued to withhold a significant number of U.S. remains. PAVN's ADWOC System for Air Defense One aspect of the Vietnamese systems for handling American POWs that is different from the organizations discussed previously are PAVN's Air Defense units. The Vietnamese maintained a massive Air Defense force designed to protect the homeland and monitor intrusions into its airspace. This system was designed and equipped by the Soviets. The true heart of the Air Defense system was the Command and Control (C&C) system known as the Air Defense and Warning Operation Center (ADWOC.) Air Defense Headquarters was located at Bach Mai Airfield in Hanoi. According to a former NSA analyst responsible during the war for PAVN Air Defense forces, American POWs came under ADWOC control as a result of both heat of the battle results, and preplanned and deployed "flak traps" to capture specific pilots.72 Most pilots captured in the heat of the battle by Air Defense units were quickly passed on to higher echelon political authorities. However, "flak traps" were ADWOC ordered AAA deployments designed to shoot down and recover both specific pilots or their aircraft. NSA intercepts seen by the analyst indicated that the men captured in these ADWOC directed missions were provided "special handling," i.e. sent to the Soviet Union. Additionally, after Tet '68, the PAVN 367th Air Division began to retain some POWs for forced labor to construct underground logistics facilities in Laos. The majority of these men probably died in captivity and have never been accounted for. A recent book by a former soldier involved with MACV-SOG during the war states this his team stumbled onto an air vent protruding from the side of a mountain in Laos. His men claimed that they could clearly hear American voices emanating from the air vent.73 It is unclear whether DPMO has taken these claims seriously. Other Vietnamese offices and intelligence debates The Intelligence and Public Security Services also played other roles in matters involving American prisoners. In addition to monitoring foreign diplomatic communications in Hanoi, the Technical Reconnaissance Office, KG-3, of the Ministry of Public Security was responsible for the censorship of all letter mail and parcels sent to or from U.S. POWs. KG-3 also planted audio and video surveillance devices in both detention cells and interrogation rooms occupied by U.S. personnel, and monitored POW "tap" codes in use during the war.74 The amount of MPS bugging of POW cells has never been revealed. Indeed, surreptitious filming also took place. One of the authors spoke to a journalist working on postwar film projects in Hanoi who was provided motion picture footage of U.S. POWs, which was obviously filmed without the knowledge of the subjects. One author was also allowed to view approximately 20 minutes of this same film, showing a well-known American POW, now serving as an elected official, in his cell and outside in the Hoa Lo courtyard. After the war ended in 1975, Office KG-3 established a new office in South Vietnam located in the former CIA communications room on the top floor of the former American Embassy. This office was designated KG-3B. During the fall of 1992, Office KG-3 also installed the telephones and fax system for Detachment 2, JTF-FA at the "Ranch" compound in Hanoi. This telephone and fax system was primarily used by U.S. government officials to discuss strategy in dealing with the Vietnamese on the POW/MIA issue. Two areas of great debate has been how much information, including parts
from downed American planes or their pilots, the North Vietnamese shared
with the USSR, the PRC, and other communist countries. A CIA report from
Saigon just prior to the withdrawal of American forces states, "Starting
with the 1960 visit to NVN of a deputy chief of the KGB and the initiation
of professional training for MPS cadres in the Soviet Union sponsored by the
KGB, the MPS maintained a close but controlled liaison with Soviet KGB
officials in Hanoi. Conversely, although the Chinese Communist advisors to
the MPS were withdrawn in 1958, the MPS continued to maintain liaison with
the Communist Chinese Ministry of Public Security officials attached to
their Hanoi embassy to exchange information. (Field Comment: Although the
Source does not claim the MPS also maintained a field relationship with KGB There is additional information available indicating that the intelligence shared by the MPS with the USSR and the PRC was considered valuable to the extent that it created competition between the two countries. "In spite of the obvious great importance for both sides of this collaboration, our military-scientific specialists in the DRV continue to operate under difficult circumstances, which are often artificially complicated by our Vietnamese comrades. It is known that trips to the sites of downed aircraft is the Soviet specialists' main method of collecting pieces of equipment. This system is set up by the Vietnamese side. The Vietnamese, however, hide the aircraft crash sites from us using various pretexts. They delay our trips, even after giving us permission to go to the crash site. It is for this reason that the main source of information regarding aircraft crash sites comes from the observation of Soviet specialists. There have been many times when downed aircraft were examined by qualified specialists before the arrival of our specialists. That has now been cleared up; it turned out to be Chinese."76 The other great debate has raged over whether American POWs were categorized according to their perceived intelligence and propaganda value. Many interrogation reports mention that American POWs were categorized, mainly into different groups labeled "progressive" or "stubborn." The CIA report remarks that "prisoners were listed as, "A," special due to the important information they possessed, "B," those who had the same intelligence value as "A" but who were uncooperative, and "C," those whose continued presence in the DRV, after thorough debriefing, offered little or no advantages to the DRV. No attempt was made to contact relatives in the U.S. of certain categories for the following reasons: Prisoners in categories "A" and "B" were not exploited for the purposes of collecting information through their contacts in the U.S. or by attempting these contacts to engage in anti-war activities. This was not done because it might have led to the surfacing of their identities. The identity of category "A" prisoners were carefully guarded because identifying them as POWs rather than as missing or killed-in-action would permit the U.S. to employ countermeasures to negate the value of the information they provided. Similarly, the identity of the category "B" prisoners was kept secret because they may not have survived the interrogations or other techniques used to make them cooperate."77 Ministry of Foreign Affairs After the fall of Saigon, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) became the lead Vietnamese government agency involved in the POW/MIA issue. The MFA participated in the post-war search of the remains of Americans, and coordinated with the MND and MOI to find American grave sites. The MFA's main strategy in the 1980's "was to wear down U.S. resolve and elicit from Washington increasingly significant concessions in return for minor POW/MIA cooperation." This was "the result of a long-standing Vietnamese Foreign Ministry strategy intent on offering minimum concessions to the U.S. and prolonging negotiations over basic principles of humanitarian cooperation and technical approaches to uncovering information."78 Apparently the MFA was fulfilling its duties due to the "consular affairs" relationship with the various diplomatic missions in Hanoi. However, with the removal of Nguyen Co Thach as Foreign Minister in mid-1991, the lead role of the MFA in the issue was curtailed, although many aspects of the MFA involvement had been closely controlled by the External Affairs Section of the Party Executive Committee headed by Mr. Hong Ha. For instance, some defecting Sources have indicated that officials working in the MFA who are assigned duties associated with the issue of U.S. POW/MIA have been "sheep dipped." As was the case with the French Task Force during the first Indochina War, the assignment of experienced Vietnamese Political cadre from the General Political Directorate (GPD) to Vietnam's Foreign Ministry to manage POWs and subsequently to participate in negotiations with American diplomats, has also occurred. In the past such GPD Political Cadre included Senior Colonels Tran Quang Co and Ha Van Lau, both of whom later became legitimate diplomats with the rank of Ambassador and Vice-Foreign Minister.79 In order to provide effective management of the American accounting efforts, the VCP similarly detached Political cadre such as "Ambassadors" Tran Hoan, Nguyen Can, Cu Dinh Ba, and Nguyen Xuan Phong from the GPD to the Foreign Ministry during the 1980's and 90's. Although ostensibly collocated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the "Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing Personnel" (VNOSMP), the efforts of these officials have actually been coordinated by a small office located on Nguyen Gia Thieu Street in Hanoi, near the residence of former Foreign Minister and Politburo member Mr. Nguyen Co Thach. Also playing an important role in the transition from party to government control of the issue is the head of the External Affairs Section of the National Assembly, Mr. Hoang Bich Son, aka Ho Liem. U.S. Intelligence studies of Hanoi's Knowledge After reviewing all available information gathered since the inception of the JCRC/JTF-FA archival and investigative process begun in 1987, DOD/DPMO claims that "we now judge that we can no longer automatically assume that previous archival correlations indicate additional information can be produced today."80 However, prior to this latest survey, the Defense Intelligence Agency produced several detailed reports outlining the U.S. government's expectations for cooperation on the part of the Vietnamese in unilaterally turning over both remains and records. These studies incorporated information obtained from defectors involved with processing or storage of remains, scientific analysis of remains, wartime interrogations and captured document translations. They built on an even earlier detailed survey undertaken by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) which indicated that 1485 remains could be recovered and repatriated by the Vietnamese without the deployment of U.S. field teams in Indochina.81 Produced by DIA's Special Office for Prisoner of War and Missing in Action, the forerunner of the DPMO, one lengthy report was devastating in its critique of the Vietnamese ability to account for missing Americans. "We will also suggest that Vietnam's political aims have in fact influenced the selection of remains that have been repatriated...the inevitable conclusion reached...is that not only can Vietnam account for many more Americans than it has chosen to admit, but also that the SRV has recovered many more sets of American remains than it has repatriated."82 This study went on further to clearly articulate that "Vietnam's motivations for withholding cooperation are complex but rest principally on the belief that both the information and the remains they have cached represent valuable commodities that if carefully and thriftily managed can be translated over the long-term into leverage and influence with the U.S. and perhaps even into monetary gain. Vietnam, relying perhaps on historical insights, is apparently calculating that it can wait the U.S. out and in the meantime will cooperate only on a minimal and piecemeal basis. What Vietnam treats as an issue of prudent resource management, however, is for the U.S. a moral and humanitarian matter...We must resolve ourselves to the fact that achieving the fullest possible accounting for our missing men will require a long-term commitment in which perseverance and a firm negotiating stance will play a key role."83 This opinion did not change as more information became available to the U.S. intelligence community. According to a key point of another DIA briefing presented to the Vietnamese in May 1992, "Finally, our forensics experts tell us that approximately 70 per cent of U.S. remains returned by your government show evidence of long-term storage. By this we mean they exhibited minimal bone mass loss, commingling with other remains of individuals lost in widely disparate areas, and coating with preservatives and/or disinfectants. Thus, while your government has returned many sets of remains that exhibit evidence of storage, the information available to us leads us to the conclusion that there are still American remains that are readily available or easily retrievable and that could be repatriated to the U.S. in a very short period of time." Concerning the ability of Vietnam to provide records, the briefing indicated that, "Based on information acquired through original documents, wartime and refugee interviews, and other sources, we have learned that PAVN developed a specialized cadre and a dedicated organization to handle foreign prisoners and casualties during the first Indochina War. That cadre and organization, which appear to have continued to operate into the early 1960's, was adapted to deal with U.S. Forces when they were introduced into Indochina."84 When faced with the DIA's consistent position, Vietnam's Propaganda Department moved to counter the briefing by raising the issue of "grave robbers," and "remains traders." This was not altogether unexpected by skilled U.S. negotiators with long-time experience in dealing with Asian Communists. However, some officials responsible for the issue sought to gain sympathy for Vietnam's position with key White House officials by minimizing the conclusions of these studies. The in-depth studies were countered by a memo from the President's Special Emissary for POW/MIA Affairs in Vietnam, who stated, "It appears to me that the difficulties of terrain, the effects of high-G impacts on the human body, the effects of climate on the remains, the errors in location of remote area graves and associated difficulties of finding them several years later, and the questionable efficiency of a reporting system under wartime attack might push the probabilities in the various steps well below that which the DIA has implicitly assumed. Further, I don't believe we have any real handle on the extent civilian scavenging of crash sites and battlefields has disrupted the government's attempts to collect remains. Simply put, there are a lot of unknowns in Vietnam. Getting remains into "the warehouse" was not so easy as the bearer of the DIA briefing may infer."85 The Postwar Proselytizing Effort As further evidence of Vietnamese long-term management plans regarding the issue of American POW/MIAs, after the Vessey trip in 1987, wartime Binh van cadre were transferred to duties placing them in positions ensuring continued contact with American targets with potential for exploitation regarding political and economic concessions, such as removing the trade embargo and improved U.S./Vietnam relations. Concerning the strategic role of both the Civilian and Military Proselytizing elements of the SRV, we have witnessed various stages: insurgency, conventional war effort, liberation, consolidation, and finally economic development of the country. A detailed government study illustrates the basic principle applied by the communists in the beginning stage. "The VC have long understood the axiom of insurgent warfare; that an insurgency cannot succeed without the active support of a small part of the population of the target country, and the passive support of a larger share of the population of the target country."86 Although not yet confirmed as being entirely accurate, a review of the name lists of cadre involved with American POWs during the war against the name lists of cadre who were assigned to work with Americans after the war is revealing. For example, an MR-5 female Binh van cadre, Ms. Nguyen Thi Ngoc Suong was head of the Quang Ngai Military Proselytizing "Penetration" subsection in charge of covert agents. Ms. Suong was involved in several cases where American personnel were lured to capture by English speaking female agents during the war. The current listing indicates that a Ms. Nguyen Thi Ngoc Suong has been assigned as the Vice-chairman of the Vietnam Petroleum Organization dealing with representatives of American oil companies. Recently there has been much controversy concerning Vietnam's decision to build a major oil refinery in a remote area of Quang Ngai Province. MR-5 Binh van cadre Nguyen Chinh was transferred to become the Deputy Director of the Religious Affairs Department in Hanoi dealing with U.S. officials concerned with human rights. Senior cadre Ho Nghinh, aka Ho Huu Phuoc, a brother of Mr. Hoang Bich Son, served as the Party Secretary of Quang Nam-Danang during the war and Chairman of the Military Management Committee for Danang when the war ended. He has now been assigned to the Committee for Economic Development. During the war years U.S. intelligence reports indicated that Mr. Ho Nghinh was in charge of an English language training program for female agents involved in luring Americans to capture. Mr. Nguyen Van Hung, who studied English at the Vietnamese-American Association in Hoi An, where Garwood was captured, later became the interpreter in the POW camp where Mr. Garwood was held for several years. After an extended tour in the former Soviet Union, Mr. Hung returned to Danang to teach in the Foreign Language Institute under the tutelage of Professor Ho An, who served as the National Liberation Front Representative and Indoctrination expert in Mr. Garwood's camp. Former interrogator of U.S. POWs in South Vietnam, Mr. Nguyen Hung Tri, was reassigned as the Director of the Export Department, Vietnam National Petroleum Import-Export Corporation. Former interrogator Dang Thuan Hoa was reassigned to the Ho Chi Minh City Commercial Affairs Office. In an attempt to proselytize the leadership of U.S. veterans organizations, former Deputy Minister of Defense, Political Commissar of Military Region 4 (DMZ), and former head of the Enemy Proselytizing Department, LTG Tran Van Quang, was reassigned as head of the National Veterans Organization of Vietnam. He has been tasked to work with U.S. organizations, such as the Vietnam Veterans of America (VVA). A "Veterans to Veterans" approach was initiated by the VVA, in which the leadership of this veterans group asked its membership for any records or memorabilia relating to Vietnamese MIAs. In turn, the Vietnamese veterans might be more forthcoming on American MIA information that their veterans might "possess." Many Vietnamese cadre hope to cash in on the expected travel boom by acting as guides to former battle sites. Doing so requires a higher level of services than most Vietnamese villages can now provide. However, after several JTF-FA trips to particular Vietnamese villages for crash site inspections, one often notices new construction of guest houses for the impending tourist traffic. These "Guest houses" are often managed by former communist security cadre. The amount of money spent in Vietnam on visits by the VVA leadership and its members, compared to the minimal results achieved in MIA accounting, indicates that the Vietnamese may be guiding the American veterans organizations into the same 32 year old rut in the accounting road left by the French. It can hardly be termed a "coincidence" that LTC Nguyen Van Be, who
interrogated Mr. Garwood and several other U.S. POWs during the war has now
been reassigned as manager of the My Khe Hotel at China Beach. Ironically,
the Commander of Joint Task Force-Full Accounting, as well as the Commander
of the JTF-FA Detachment in Hanoi have visited the My Khe Hotel for
"in-country" rest and recuperation on several occasions. Apparently they
have made no attempt to contact the "manager" concerning his knowledge of
missing Americans. The former Camp Commander of the Loc Son Camp, where Mr.
Garwood and several other American POWs were processed en route to the
Military Region 5 camp, Mr. Vo Kim Ho, aka Chin Ho, has now been assigned as
the director of the Danang Tourism Company. Former GPD Security Cadre and
head of the Quang Nam-Danang POW/MIA task Team, Mr. Mai Quy Trung, has now
been assigned as the Director of the Asia Tourism Company. All three of
these cadre have been involved in arranging trips for the Veterans The post-war reassignment of proselytizing cadre experienced in U.S. POW handling to political, economic, human rights, and veterans affairs organizations involved with the United States indicates that the Vietnam Communist Party intends to continue its long established process of "gaining the active support of a small part of the population" by exploiting U.S. officials, business groups, and veterans organizations. The extent to which this has already occurred, to the detriment of MIA accounting, can only be determined by careful scrutiny of the official and unofficial contacts by representatives of the governments and private organizations from both sides during recent years. Conclusions It is increasingly obvious that regardless of the amount of hard intelligence and scientific evidence concerning Vietnam's duplicity made available to Washington and Hawaii, the White House has been repeatedly counseled to move forward in the normalization process, under the guise that Vietnam is not only cooperating for the present, but for unexplained reasons are expected to be even more forthcoming in the near term. To lay the ground work for explaining this phenomenon, the Defense Department has begun subtly indicating that "we have previously been operating under false assumptions." The recent Zero-based Review is an example of this new thinking. Because the government suddenly possesses so much more "detailed information" than in 1992, the conclusions from the accumulated experience and information gathered from over twenty years of examining Vietnamese POW policies and systems have now been discarded. Despite this new attitude, however, not all the actions of the governments in Southeast Asia can be easily written off. "The Lao Government has steadfastly refused requests to review their wartime archives or to interview military veterans and political officials. Consequently, we only interview local villagers, most of whom were not in the loss areas during the war."87 As an example of the political advice the President receives, President Clinton's so-called "point-man" on the POW/MIA issue, Veteran's Administration Deputy Secretary Hershel Gober, himself a Vietnam veteran and native Arkansan, travelled to Vietnam to observe digging operations west of Danang during 1994. After returning to the U.S., Deputy Secretary Gober began calling for more movement in the normalization process. In September 1994, a delegation from the Arkansas Governor's Task Force on POW/MIA coordinated a "fact finding" trip to Vietnam with Deputy Secretary Gober. After a four day visit to JTF-FA and the Vietnamese Office for Seeking Missing Personnel (VNOSMP) in Vietnam, the delegation included the following in their trip report: "The United States needs to expedite the normalization process with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam at the earliest possible moment. The strategic benefits to be gained by an alliance with this country to offset the influence of Communist China should be paramount in the long range goals of the United States. The Defense Department is apparently hamstrung in its efforts to completely resolve the MIA issue because of the standards imposed upon them for resolution of the identity of United States Congress to enact legislation to establish a final, definitive, category, with the approval of the next of kin of the missing Americans, to reach conclusions based on reasonable standards without having to depend upon identification techniques not yet technically feasible."88 In the report, the delegation thanked several organizations for making the trip possible, including the Arkansas Industrial Development Commission, the Maybelline Company, Remington Arms, and Delta Airlines. Mention by the Arkansas delegation of the situation wherein the members came away with the conclusion that the Defense Department was "hamstrung in its efforts to completely resolve the MIA issue," and that the President should recommend Congress enact legislation to establish a final conclusion without having to depend upon "identification techniques not yet technically feasible," indicates far more profound political insight than could normally be expected of a delegation of state-level officials from Arkansas. A review of events leading up to the departure of the delegation, however, may shed some light on this particular aspect. One month before the delegation left Arkansas, the Military Command in Hawaii held a round-table discussion dedicated to approaching this same delicate issue. According to the results of the meeting, "The purpose of this message is to encourage submission of cases through established AFIRB procedures where insufficient biological remains exist to establish identity of the remains. USACILHI is currently preparing cases for submission that will rely on acceptance of non-biological evidence to establish the identity of the remains."89 Although this new, progressive attitude for finalizing cases has been well received by major American corporations seeking to do business in Vietnam, most MIA family member and veterans organizations have expressed dismay at the U.S. Government's contention that the number of compelling discrepancy cases has been reduced to "only 50." They are quick to point out that the government figure of 50 does not include the more than 100 discrepancy cases in Laos or the Ho Chi Minh Trail area where the American serviceman involved was last known to be alive at the time of his disappearance. What this means is, that of the original 305 discrepancy cases, 196 occurred inside Vietnam, and at present only 50 of those 196 are unresolved. This would seem to indicate that 146 cases have been solved by the JTF-FA. In reality, however, only 26 of these 146 cases have been resolved with identifiable remains of the missing men. The other 146 cases have been resolved based entirely on circumstantial evidence. Thus one can easily see why the VCP is interested in gaining the cooperation of the "Veterans Initiative," obviously in the hope that untrained veterans, interested primarily in healing their own psychological challenges, will unwittingly serve to increase the weight given to such "circumstantial" evidence. Ironically, although circumstantial evidence is considered adequate to determine that an American serviceman is dead, it is not considered sufficient to conclude that a man is still alive. Circumstantial evidence gained by young, inexperienced infantry officers of the JTF-FA or by Veterans Initiative personnel touring Vietnam may not be enough to convince stalwart family members of the missing men. Concerning the verbal testimony indicating that the men are dead obtained from so-called "witnesses" prepared in advance and introduced by the Government of Vietnam, one only has to look at the local phone book to find numbers for the "Speaking Company," the "Acting Company," the "Mobile Propaganda Company," the "Tradition Office," or the "War Crimes Vestiges Office" of the Information and Culture Ministry. Several elected officials of the U.S. government have also called for normalization with Vietnam, including Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts and Senator Tom Harkin of Iowa. Sen. Kerry has remarked publicly on Vietnam's "superb" cooperation, and he has been seen by many as championing Vietnam's attempts to lift the economic embargo and diplomatic sanctions. While Chairman of the Select Committee, he conducted several trips to Vietnam. One such trip was in April 1992. Senator Kerry visited a prison camp where Vietnamese officials informed him that not only were there no Americans being held in the camp, no Americans had ever been detained there during the war. Satisfied with this statement, Senator Kerry returned to the U.S. and praised the Government of Vietnam for its openness and superb cooperation. This set the precedent for key personnel of the JTF-FA to follow the Senator's lead in praising Vietnam. Eight months later, however, an American prisoner was released by the Vietnamese. During his debriefing, the man said he was held in the same prison visited by Senator Kerry at the time of his visit. The man said he was moved from the prison to another detention site one day prior to the Senator's arrival, and then moved back two days after the Senator departed. One is left to wonder that if the Vietnamese are this duplicitous with one of their biggest supporters, what can the U.S. government expect. Sen. Harkin visited Vietnam on July 4th, 1995, in which he also praised their cooperation in solving the POW/MIA issue. Upon returning to the U.S., Sen. Harkin personally briefed President Clinton and encouraged him to move forward in the normalization process, to include access by American businesses in Vietnam to the Overseas Private Investment Corp. Insurance (OPIC). However, MIA family members were alarmed to discover that his wife is President and CEO of this organization. This organization is designed to "bail out" American investors from potential failures due to Vietnamese government reneging on business contracts and financial investments. What the MIA family members find hard to understand is, if elected officials such as Sen. Harkin as well as the American business community do not trust the Vietnamese with their investments, how can the family members be expected to trust the Vietnamese with an honest accounting for their loved ones. They are reminded of the opinion of respected CBS news correspondent Dan Rather who visited Hanoi shortly before President Clinton lifted the Trade Embargo on February 3rd, 1994. Upon his return, Rather described in an article for the Washington Review how angry he was, after being told point blank by a Vietnamese official in Hanoi, that Vietnamese policymakers were certain President Clinton would soon lift the Trade Embargo "because Americans will do anything for money." This revealing comment by Rather, who is considered to have a liberal view of U.S. relations with Vietnam, served to underscore to the MIA families the perception that the POW/MIA issue was being overwhelmed by the Clinton Administration's desires to open trade and diplomatic links with Vietnam at the expense of their missing loved ones. Further deepening the families dismay, after the Senate Select Committee adjourned, some of the key personnel assigned to the Committee quickly seized high salaried positions within the U.S./Vietnam Trade Council, a business group designed to facilitate normalization and trade between the U.S. and Vietnam. Activist's have also criticized the President's former Emissary for POW/MIA Affairs in Vietnam, General John Vessey (Ret.). Gen. Vessey has been described as a "low key member" of the Board of Directors of a major U.S. airline granted lucrative U.S. Government contracts to fly refugees from Vietnam to the U.S. via the Orderly Departure Program (ODP), and which is currently seeking more routine flight routes between the two countries. MIA family members were stunned to learn that the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the U.S. Vietnam Trade Council is Ambassador William H. Sullivan, who served as Ambassador in Laos during the time that many of their loved ones became missing. According to a biographical sketch on the President of the U.S./Vietnam Trade Council, this business development organization has developed close ties with the leadership of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW). As a result, the VFW's senior leaders, much to the alarm of its membership, has declared itself in favor of normalization with Hanoi, and has further stirred controversy among its' members by presenting its' "Armed Forces Award" to Major General Thomas Needham, the first Commander of the JTF-FA, and "Legislator of the Year" to Senator John McCain, a former POW. Both individuals have been severely criticized by the POW/MIA family community, Needham for ordering the shredding of thousands of POW/MIA documents at the JTF-FA office in Bangkok, Thailand, and McCain for his inexplicable demeanor during the Select Committee hearing when he routinely attacked witnesses who suggested that the government's efforts in this issue had been less than exemplary. The current Vice President of the U.S. Trade Council is Ms. Francis Zwenig, who served as Chief of Staff for the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA. Ms. Zwenig had also served as Legislative Assistant to Sen. John Kerry. As the relationship between the U.S./Vietnam Trade Council and the VFW developed, some activists claimed that the National Commander-in-Chief of the respected veteran's organization was "selling out" the POW/MIAs in return for the promise of a high-salaried position within the Clinton Administration. At the VFW National Convention in Phoenix, AZ during August 1995, the leadership of the VFW characterized such claims as "rumors and innuendo" not worthy of comment. Later in October of that same year, the Veterans Administration sent out a notice to veterans organizations stating "We are pleased to announce that Mr. Allen "Gunner" Kent recently joined our staff and will be assisting us in our liaison work with you and your colleagues in the respective veterans service organizations.90 This revelation, along with the VFW's support for the President on moving forward in the normalization process with Vietnam prior to a full accounting caused a serious drop in the VFW's membership renewals for 1996, most notably among Vietnam era veterans. So much for rumor and innuendo. Although the U.S. Government claims that Vietnam is doing everything it can to account for the 2,200 American personnel still unaccounted-for in Indochina, this contention is not supported by the facts. In reviewing this information, a picture emerges of a complex system heavy influenced by Vietnam Communist Party policies and goals and strictly controlled by trusted Party political cadre. All available evidence suggests that the Vietnam Communist Party continues to control and manipulate this issue for economic and political concessions. For instance, much of the money paid to Hanoi for JTF-FA activities is being sent by the U.S. Navy Regional Contracting Office in Singapore through the Bank of America to the account of the External Affairs section of the Communist party. Further, evidence of a complex wartime record keeping system indicates that Vietnam could provide important information on many of the 305 discrepancy cases, as well as crash sites and grave sites, and could rapidly account for a significant number of MIA cases. The amount of influence that Vietnam's efforts have had on post-war policy-level decisions made in Washington can only be assessed by comparing concessions made to Vietnam by the White House with those made to the United States by the Politburo in Vietnam. Despite having received significant concessions from the current administration, the Vietnamese have continued to slowly release to U.S. government officials small, piecemeal increments of remains and records. The obvious implication is that those critical of U.S. Government claims to the effect that Vietnam is cooperating on the POW/MIA issue, are to a degree at least, justified in maintaining their views. If Hanoi strategists are successful in gaining the "active support of a small part of the population," by exploiting either economic greed or the desire for political influence by key officials within the White House or the American business and veterans communities, but nevertheless are unable to gain the "passive support" of the population at large, there is likely to be lingering controversy on the POW/MIA issue for many years into the future. 1. Initially, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was the U.S. government agency responsible for the POW/MIA issue. The Defense Department in 1992 created a new office outside of DIA, DPMO, specifically to handle this issue. Specialists of the DIA working on this issue from the war years have now been incorporated into this office. 2. "A Zero-based Comprehensive Review of Cases Involving Unaccounted for Americans in Southeast Asia," Report by Department of Defense (DOD), November 13, 1995, p. 1. Hereafter referred to as "Zero-based." 3. A check of the Institute for Scientific Information's Index to Social Scientific Technical Papers (ISSTP) database of published papers revealed no papers on the Vietnam War POW/MIA issue over the last five years. 4. The CIA maintains an office for monitoring foreign news media, called the "Foreign Broadcast Information Service," or FBIS. During the war, U.S. intelligence identified many captured servicemen held in North Vietnam through FBIS monitoring of communist media. 5. Known as the Combined Document Exploitation Center, or CDEC by its' military acronym, an enormous volume of enemy documents were screened, translated, reproduced on microfilm, and studied for any intelligence value. The documents were summarized and published in daily "Bulletins," with each separate document having its' own Log Number. Some CDEC documents found in archives outside the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) often are missing Bulletin numbers or were issued as Intelligence Information Reports (IIR). The authors have attempted to be as detailed as possible in providing the proper citations for the CDEC material. The collection, consisting of 955 reels of microfilm, currently resides at the NARA II in College Park, MD in Record Group 472, Records of the United Sta tes Military Forces in SE Asia, 1950-1975, and at the William Joiner Center in Boston, MA. Paper copies of the Bulletins and selected translated documents through 1967 are also located at NARA II. 6. Pike, Douglas. PAVN: Peoples Army of Vietnam, Presidio Press, 1986, p.153. 7. "Experience gained in capturing U.S. prisoners," Captured North Vietnamese documents of the Combined Documents Exploitation Center (CDEC), Bulletin #29,649, Document Log #02-2090-70, Roll 941, RG 472, NARA II, College Park, MD. Herea fter referred to as “CDEC. 8. Controlled American Source (CAS) report, FVS 33,092. This CIA interrogation report probably originated at the National Interrogation Center (NIC), the joint CIO/CIA interrogation center in Saigon. This document can be located in the Indochina Archive and is in the authors' possession. 9. "Viet Cong Policy Toward and Exploitation of U.S. Prisoners of War," CIA Intelligence Information Report, dated 14 March 1967, NSF Country File, Vietnam, Folder 81, Document 70, p.4, LBJ Library, Austin, TX. This document is also located in the new CIA FOIA system called MORI, (Management of Released Information). Due to heavy and often uneven redaction policies, CIA cables are often missing cable numbers and other identifying media. Again, the authors have attempted to provide as much information to the reader as possible to assist in identifying the documents. All CIA Intelligence Information Reports hereafter referred to as "CIA Cable." 10. "NLF Instructions on Treatment of American Prisoners." This captured document can be found in the Indochina Ar chive, Unit 2, Section 8, POW/MIA file 12/63, Institute for East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, CA. The Archive document collection currently resides at the Center for the Study of the Vietnam Conflict at Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX. 11. "Guide for Interrogation of US Prisoners of War, Military Proselytizing Section, VC MR-5," CDEC Bulletin #48,829, Log #4-1654-72, RG 472, NARA II, College Park, MD. The partial translation of this document, along with the original notebook, can viewed on Reel 903. Hereafter referred to as "Guide." 12. The CNC was PAVN's main intelligence organization. CNC agents were designed to gather intelligence on logistics, strategy, plans, and operations. The CNC will be discussed in more detail later in the paper. 13. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), Command History 1967, Vol. II, page 979-980. 14. "Viet Cong Policy and Treatment of Prisoners of War," CAS Field report FVS-17,512, dated 24 July 19 68, Reel 78, Vietnam-era POW/MIA Documentation Collection, Photoduplication Set, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. There are two sets of POW/MIA microfilm at the Library of Congress. One set is managed by the Photoduplication service (PDS), the other by the Federal Research Division (FRD). Hereafter referred to as "PDS" or "FRD," and "L.O.C." 15. "VC Treatment of US Prisoners of War," Strategic Research & Analysis Division, Directorate of Intelligence Production, dated 15 October 1969, p. 2, quoting a captured document. 16. Rand report RM-5729-1-ARPA, "Prisoners of War in Indochina," dated January, 1969, p. 6. 17. State Department cable 3032, From Amembassy Paris To Secstate: Subject: Repatriation of French Remains from North Vietnam, dated 041725Z Mar 76. 18. State Department cable 3032, p. 4. 19. "The Responsibilities of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam Intelligence and Security Services in the Exploitation of American Prisoners of War," Central Intelligence Agency study, dated 17 November 1975, Roll 5 13, Folder 32, p. 3-6, PDS, L.O.C. This study of the DRV's intelligence services was done using interrogation reports from captured or rallied enemy prisoners who had directly participated in the handling of American POWs. Unfortunately, when the CIA released the document, they did not include the footnotes listing the sources used to compile the report. However, the author's are very familiar with the information given to the U.S. by the rallier Dr. Dang Tan, who was by the Agency's admission a prolific reporter who provided them with the best picture of the inner working of the DRV MPS system for U.S. POWs. Much of Dr. Tan’s material appears in this report. Apparently, in 1975 the CIA still regarded Dr. Tan’s information as important and factual. Hereafter referred to as "Responsibilities." 20. Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) Directive #165. This captured document is located in the Indochina Archive, POW/MIA file for 1/73. 21. Responsibilities, p. 6. 22. Radio Hanoi Broadcast, July 6, 1988, monitored and reported by Special Assistant Bill Bell. 23. "Viet Cong Instructions regarding Management and Exploitation of Prisoners captured in Binh Dinh Province," CIA cable TDCS 314/04542-72, dated 15 June 1972, MORI database, p. 6. 24. "Summary of Activities, North Vietnamese Intelligence Services, (1 Oct 69-30 Jun 70)," Headquarters, USARPAC, dated 1 November 1970, p. 3. 25. "Delineation of Responsibilities of the North Vietnamese Army Enemy Proselytizing Department, the Cuc Nghien Cuu, and the Ministry of Public Security in the Handling and Interrogation of US POWs in NVN," CIA cable, dated 15 July 1970, Reel 320, Folder 27, p. 1, PDS, L.O.C. 26. DTG020728Z Apr 93, From CJTF-FA Det One Bangkok Thailand, To CDR JTF-FA Honolulu, HI, Subj: SRV Oral History, LTC Huynh Khac Chieu by JTF-FA Special Assistant (SA) Bill Bell, Ben Tre City, SRV. Bell was tasked to institute an Oral History program of senior SRV cadre, and spoke to over twenty senior Vietnamese cadre before leaving the JTF-FA. All interviews hereafter referred to as "Oral History." 27. "South Vietnam Liberation Army (SVNLAF) Directive 1/H Exhorting Subregion 1 Troops to Capture Many Prisoners of War, Particularly Americans, to Serve the Political and Diplomatic Struggles," CIA cable, dated 24 June 1971, MORI database, p. 2. 28. Public Presentation of U.S. Prisoners of War," Vietnam Document and Research Notes, Document 65, dated August 1969, p. 3. 29. "South Vietnam Liberation Army Enemy Proselytizing Office Handling of Prisoners of War," CIA cable, dated 25 March 1971, MORI database, p. 3. Note: At the Central government level in Hanoi, Enemy Proselytizing was considered a department, i.e., Cuc, abbreviated by wartime analysts as EPD. At COSVN in the South, Enemy Proselytizing was considered an office, i.e., Phong, abbreviated as PDV. 30. "Military Proselytizing Instructional Material," CDEC Bulletin #3826, CDEC Log #04-2212-67, Reel 907, RG 472, NARA II, College Park, MD. 31. DTG 051223Z April 93, Oral History interview with Major General Vo Van Thoi, by SA Bill Bell, Saigon, SRV. 32. "Intelligence and Security Operations of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Ministry of National Defense Enemy Proselytizing Department," CIA Study, dated December 1979, Reel 513, Folder 33, p. 8, PDS, L.O.C. 33. Guide, p. 2. 34. "VCI of the Military Proselytizing Section, Quang Ngai Province Party Committee, MR 5," Records of the Combined Military Interrogation Center (CMIC) Intelligence Information Report (IIR) 6 029 0007 72, Box 51, RG 472, NARA, Suitland, MD. 35. DOD Uncorrelated Reports, IIR 6 075 1405 66, dated 6 Jun 66, Co C, 519 MI BN, Vol. IX , p. 54. 36. MACV Command History 1972-1973, Annex A, p. A-39. 37. Radio Propaganda Report, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Research Series, RS.81, 9 Mar 66. 38. "Resolution on the people's security missions adopted by TV KBN," CDEC Doc Log No. 07-1272-72, Current Affairs Committee of the MPS, 11 Apr 72. 39. This individual in charge of the Penetration sub-section in Ms. Nguyen Thi Ngoc Suong, who is mentioned later in greater depth. 40. J-2 Weekly Intelligence Estimate Update (WIEU) for 13 February 19 71, p. 43-44, CDEC Roll 876, NARA II, College Park, MD. 41. Oral History interview with LTC Huynh Khac Chieu, p. 2. 42. "Hearings before the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs," December 4, 1992, p. 1221. 43. "Sharpening the Third Prong: An Increase in Viet Cong Proselytizing," Vietnam Documents and Research Notes, Document 18, February 1968, p. 3. 44. "Thim Hai's directive on proselytizing and treatment of Pws," CDEC Bulletin #1224, CDEC Log #10-1376-66, Reel 915, RG 472, NARA II, College Park, MD. 45. DTG 2 20750Z December 92, SRV Oral History Interview with Major Pham Van Khoi by SA Bill Bell, Hanoi, SRV. Bell spoke on many occasions with Major Khoi concerning Vietnamese wartime organizational structure. Major Khoi was a member of Office 22, Group 875, and was involved with field grade U.S. POWs during the war. 46. DTG 091842Z August 1993, Oral History interview of Mr. Nguyen Hung Tri by Robert DeStatte, Hanoi, SRV, p. 6. Mr. Tri was a former PAVN 2LT attached to Headquarters, SVNL A, and was the interpreter at the U.S. POW camp unit TB-20. As of this report, Mr. Tri was the Director, Export Department, Vietnam National Petroleum Import-Export Corporation. 47. DTG 261015Z January 93, Oral History interview with Senior Colonel Pham Van Ban, aka Ba (3) Ban, by SA Bill Bell, Hanoi, SRV. Col. Ban was the second in command of the Enemy Proselytizing Section of COSVN for a large portion of the war. 48. "South Vietnam Liberation Army Enemy Proselytizing Office Handling of Prisoners of War," CIA cable, 25 Mar 71. 49. Captured document found in Case file of Robert Garwood, PDS set, Reel 1, L.O.C. 50. DTG 051936Z January 94, Oral History interview with Nguyen Dinh Trang by TSGT Ronald Ward, Danang, SRV. 51. It must be noted that some cadre did not view the attempt to persuade Americans to cross over as very successful. One Oral History interview with Vietnamese cadre member To Dieu notes that after meeting Bobby Garwood, he realized that this Enemy Proselytizing goal was incompatible in terms of results. 52. Vietnamese documents turned over in 1995. 53. Task Force Russia document TFR-136-11. 54. "Comments of a COSVN Cadre on Communist Utilization of U.S. Prisoners of War Released to Foster Communist Propaganda Objectives," CIA cable CS 317/09008/72, Reel 354, FRD, L.O.C. 55. "Toan Dan Thi Dua Lam Cong Tac Binh Van" (All People Emulate the Work of Proselytizing the Troops) undated, National Liberation Front document, Indochina Archive. 56. "North Vietnamese Policy on Prisoners of War," CIA cable, 8 February 1977, MORI database, p . 2. 57. "Policy towards US POW's," CDEC Bulletin #7131, CDEC Log #09-1134-67, NARA II, College Park, MD. 58. Intelligence Report, Sub: Prisoner of War Questionnaire Used by the Military Proselytizing Section, Front 7, Quang Tri Province, 15 Sep 69. 59. Stephen Young, interview with Bui Tin, The Asian Wall Street Journal, August 3, 1995. 60. "Proselytizing in SR-1," IIR 1 516 0628 70, dated 14 June 1970. 61. "Collection of Personal Belongings of US Servicemen," CDEC Bulletin #5783, CDEC Log #06-4188-67, NARA II, College Park, MD. 62. "Handling of US KIA, MR V," CDEC Bulletin #6450, CDEC Log #07-3510-67, NARA II, College Park, MD. 63. "Personnel effects of U.S. Servicemen," CDEC Document found in the Indochina Archive, no Bulletin number or Document number listed. 64. Stars and Stripes, 18 December 1967, p. 6. 65. "Lao Company 18 to disinterred the remains of Americans killed at Phou Pha Thi," NSA intercept dated 6 June 1977, PDS, Reel 271, L.O.C. 66. "Records Maintained by a Senior Lao Government and Communist Party Official Listing American MIA from the War in Lao," CIA cable dated 20 June 1977, p. 2. 67. DTG 040928Z Sep 87, FM USDAO Bangkok To DIA, "Vietnamese seize Laotian PW/MIA records," IIR 6 024 0136 87, p. 2. 68. Intelligence and Security Operations of the SRV Ministry of National Defense, December, 1979, p. 33. 69. Oral History interview with Col. Doan Hanh, former commander Office 22, Group 875, dated 28 Apr 93. 70. "The Military Justice Department of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) Ministry of National Defense; Past and Present Responsibilities for the Detention of Prisoners; Past Guarding of U.S. Prisoners of War (DOI:1964-June 1981)," CIA cable, dated 8 September 1982, PDS, Reel 320, Folder 4, p. 2, LOC. 71. Central Identification Laboratory Hawaii Memo, dated 8 April 1991. (Document in author's possession.) 72. Letter from Jerry Mooney to the authors, dated January 28, 1996. The authors would like to thank Mr. Mooney for sharing his expertise on the PAVN's Air Defense forces with us. 73. Garner, Joe R. Code Name: Copperhead, My True-Life Exploits as a Special Forces Soldier, Simon and Schuster, New York, NY, 1994, p. 285-286. 74. "Past policies of the Hanoi Government regarding U.S. personnel taken as prisoners of war or missing in action," CIA cable, no date, PDS, Reel 320, Folder 9, p. 4. L.O.C. 75. "Exchange of Intelligence Information by North Vietnam with Soviet Bloc Countries and Communist China between 1958 and 1968," CIA cable, dated 30 April 1973, PDS, Reel 513, Folder 27, p. 5. L.O.C. 76. Exchange of Intelligence Information, p. 3. 77. Responsibilities, page 20. 78. Stern, Lewis M. "Imprisoned or Missing in Vietnam: Policies of
the Vietnamese Government Concerning Captured or Unaccounted for
United States Soldiers, 1969-1994," McFarland and Co., Jefferson, NC, 79. "Khep Lai Qua Khu Dau Thuong," (Closing the Painful Past), SRV Ministry of Information and Culture Publishing House, 1994 80. Zero-based, p. 3. 81. Survey Conducted by the Joint Casualty Resolution Center, undated, by JCRC members Raymond Spock & Joe Harvey. (Document in the author's possession). 82. "Americans Missing in Indochina: An Assessment of Vietnamese Accountability," Defense Intelligence Agency, Special Office for Prisoner of War and Missing in Action, undated, FRD, Reel 304, p. 8, L.O.C. This study was probably completed in 1990. Hereafter referred to as "Accountability." 83. Accountability, p. 10. 84. Defense Intelligence Agency, Records and Remains Brief, 22 May 1992. (Document in the author's possession). 85. Gen. John Vessey memo for Secretary Baker, Secretary Cheney, and General Scowcroft, 12 January 1992. (Document in the author's possession). 86. "The Organization, Mission, and Threat of Enemy Military & Civilian Proselytizing," Strategic Research and Analysis 0169, dated 26 Aug. 69. 87. Zero-based, p. 4. 88. Report of the Arkansas POW/MIA Verification Task Force Delegation Visit to Hanoi, Vietnam, dated September 9-16, 1994. (Document in the author's possession.) 89. HQ, U.S. Pacific Command, Deputy for POW/MIA Affairs J/30M, dated 3 August 1994. (Document in the author's possession.) 90. VA ltr dated October 26, 1995, from Phillip Riggin, Special Asst to the Secretary. |